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Abstract
This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model
to examine the e¤ects of the most favored nation (MFN) clause on
equilibrium tari¤s and welfare when exporting countries are asym-
metric with respect to market structure as well as production costs.
In the model, rms sell di¤erentiated goods and compete in prices.
We contrast two policy scenarios: one where the importing country
is free to tari¤ discriminate among exporters and another where it
must treat them the same (MFN). Relative to tari¤ discrimination,
MFN benets low cost (more concentrated) exporters and hurts high
cost (less concentrated) ones. While MFN is generally preferable to
discrimination from a global welfare perspective, such need not be the
case when high cost exporters enjoy greater market power (because
they are merged into a single unit) than low cost ones. Under such a
situation, if cost di¤erences between exporters are not too large then
tari¤ discrimination favors low cost producers and is welfare preferred
to MFN.
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1 Introduction
The most favored nation (MFN) clause is widely recognized as one of the
central pillars of the multilateral trading system.1 MFN constitutes the very
rst article of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) and
occupies an important place in all multilateral trade agreements. GATT Ar-
ticle I states that . . . any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other con-
tracting parties. In other words, at the heart of MFN is the principle
of non-discrimination. But in a tari¤-ridden (second best) world, is non-
discrimination a reasonable principle to follow? In fact, there exists no
general argument in favor of non-discrimination in trade policy and the eco-
nomic case for MFN is hardly obvious (see Caplin and Krishna, 1988, Staiger,
1995 and Horn and Mavroidis, 2001). The goal of this paper is to contrast
MFN with tari¤ discrimination in an environment where rms possess mar-
ket power in order to determine whether or not under such circumstances
MFN is welfare-preferred to tari¤ discrimination. A novel feature of the
model is that it provides a comparison of MFN and tari¤ discrimination in
an environment where market structure di¤ers across countries.2
1See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) for a detailed discussion of the various multilateral
trade agreements of the WTO.
2Our model considers a rather well-dened question and ignores several important as-
pects of MFN. For example, Ethier (1999, 2002) emphasizes that MFN helps prevent
concession diversion (or bilateral opportunism as per Bagwell and Staiger, 2003) while
McCalman (2002) analyzes the impact of MFN on trade negotiations under private infor-
mation. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show how MFN and reciprocity help achieve Pareto
e¢ ciency in trade agreements. See Ederington and McCalman (2003) and Saggi (2003) for
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The model is partial equilibrium in nature and considers a world com-
prised of two exporting countries and a single importing country. In each
exporting country, there is a single industry consisting of two rms that pro-
duce symmetrically di¤erentiated goods. The importing country is assumed
to have no local production of these goods. The following two-stage game is
analyzed under tari¤ discrimination and MFN. In the rst stage, the import-
ing country chooses its optimal tari¤s to maximize its welfare (these tari¤s
depend upon whether the underlying policy regime permits or prohibits tar-
i¤ discrimination). Next, rms compete in the product market by choosing
their prices.
While the model permits exporting countries to be asymmetric along two
dimensions (production costs and market structure), to highlight the role
played by each type of asymmetry we initially consider each in isolation. In
the model, di¤erences in production cost refer to marginal cost di¤erences
whereas market structure asymmetries refer to situations where rms in only
one of the exporting countries are merged into a single unit.3 We nd that
when market structure is symmetric across exporting countries and the im-
porting country is free to tari¤ discriminate, it imposes higher tari¤s on low
cost exporters relative to high cost ones.4 Similarly, when all exporters have
the same cost, higher tari¤s are levied on the merged rm relative to com-
peting ones. The preceding results obtain because the importing country has
the role MFN and tari¤ discrimination play in sustaining multilateral tari¤ cooperation.
3Alternatively, one can assume that one of the exporting countries allows its rms to
collude. In essence, we are interested in situations where di¤erences in merger and/or
antitrust policies across countries result in di¤erences in pricing behavior of rms.
4This result also obtains in oligopoly models with Cournot competition see Gatsios
(1990), Hwang and Mai (1991), Choi (1995), and Saggi (2004).
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a stronger incentive to extract rents from rms that charge higher mark-ups
(both low cost rms and those that are merged enjoy higher mark-ups). If
the importing country switches from tari¤ discrimination to MFN, it lowers
its tari¤ on low cost (or merged) rms while raising it on high cost (or com-
peting) ones. As a result, MFN adoption has distributional implications it
benets one exporting country while hurting the other.
As might be expected, the importing country has no unilateral incentive
to adopt MFN since MFN constrains its choice set without conferring any
benet in return. But, is MFN adoption desirable from the perspective of
aggregate world welfare? Here the answer is subtle: MFN does improve world
welfare when exporters are asymmetric along only one dimension (i.e. either
they di¤er only with respect to costs or their merger status). However, when
exporters are asymmetric along both dimensions, MFN can actually lower
world welfare relative to tari¤ discrimination. This happens when a merged
unit is relatively high cost but its cost disadvantage is not too large. The
logic of this result is as follows. The importing countrys incentive to charge
a higher tari¤ on a merged rm can create a situation where a high cost
merged rm actually faces a higher tari¤ under tari¤ discrimination relative
to a low cost competing rm because of its greater market power. Such tari¤
discrimination is desirable from a world-welfare perspective since it diverts
output toward relatively low cost producers. MFN adoption can eliminate
such socially desirable discrimination and thereby lower world welfare. To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the only model that provides a demonstration
of the claim that MFN does not always welfare dominate tari¤discrimination.
Since market structure di¤erences are pervasive across countries, this result
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is relevant for assessing the practical desirability of MFN. However, it is
worth emphasizing, that this negative MFN result obtains only under certain
conditions. Even when high cost rms merge, MFN improves world welfare
relative to tari¤discrimination if the greater market power of the merged unit
is o¤set by its higher production cost in that the importing countries imposes
higher tari¤s on low cost competing rms under tari¤ discrimination.
Like Saggi (2004), the present paper uses an oligopoly model to examine
the implications of MFN. However, we di¤er from Saggi (2004) in two signif-
icant ways. First, in addition to exploring the role played by cost di¤erences
across countries, we also allow market structure to di¤er across countries.
Second, we examine price competition among rms rather than quantity com-
petition and thereby contribute to the literature on MFN under oligopoly all
of which focuses on quantity competition see Gatsios (1990), Hwang and
Mai (1991), Choi (1995), and Saggi (2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is
described in section 2. Section 3 contrasts tari¤ discrimination with MFN.
Section 4 concludes while section 5 constitutes the appendix.
2 Model
We consider a world comprised of three countries: home country (H), for-
eign country (F ), and importing country (I). In both countries H and F ,
local industry comprises of two rms each of which produces a symmetrically
di¤erentiated good that is exported to country I. Let rms be indexed by i
where i = 1; 2; 3; 4. Firms 1 and 2 are home rms while 3 and 4 are foreign
rms. Let ci denote the marginal cost of rm i where ci = ch for i = 1; 2 and
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ci = cf for i = 3; 4.
Following Shubik (1980), the demand function facing rm i is given by:
qi(p1; :::; pN) =
1
N
(  pi   (pi   1
N
NX
j=1
pj)) (1)
where pi is the price charged by rm i, qi its sales and N denotes the total
number of rms in the market. The parameter   0 measures the degree
of substitutability between di¤erent goods. When  ' 0, goods become
unrelated and as it approaches innity they become perfect substitutes.5
Firm i faces a specic tari¤ ti when exporting to country I where ti = th
for i = 1; 2 and ti = tf for rms 3 and 4. We study the following two-stage
game under tari¤ discrimination and MFN. In the rst stage, the import-
ing country chooses its optimal tari¤s to maximize its welfare (these tari¤s
depend upon whether the underlying policy regime is one of tari¤ discrim-
ination or MFN). Next, rms compete in the product market by choosing
their prices.
To examine the e¤ects of asymmetries of market structure and technol-
ogy between exporting countries on the importing countrys trade policy,
we study the above policy game under four di¤erent market structures: (i)
international duopoly with one rm in each country (D) (ii) international
triopoly with a single home rm and two foreign rms (HM); (iii) interna-
tional triopoly with a single foreign rm and two home rms (FM); and (iv)
international oligopoly with two rms in each country (O). Implicitly, we
view asymmetries in market structure across countries to be a consequence
5Note that the degree of di¤erentiation between any two goods is the same and that
the term containing  drops out when there is only one rm in the market.
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of di¤erences in national merger and/or antitrust policies. For example, un-
der market structure HM , home rms act as a single merged unit while
those in the foreign country as competitors.6 International market structure
is denoted by S where S = D, HM , FM , and O.
To obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the model back-
wards and begin with the product market stage. The maximization problem
of rm i under international oligopoly is given by:
max
fpig
i(:) =
1
4
(pi   ci   ti)(  pi   (pi   Pj)) (2)
where Pj denotes the average price in the market and it equals:
Pj 
P4
j=1 pj
4
The rst order condition for the above problem yields rm is reaction
function under international oligopoly:
pi =
4+ (3 + 4)(ci + ti) + P i
2(4 + 3)
(3)
where P i denotes the sum of prices of rm is competitors and it equals:
P i =
X
j 6=i
pj
The equilibrium price charged by rm i under oligopoly is found by solving
the reaction functions of all rms simultaneously (the relevant expression is
in the appendix). In general, we will denote equilibrium price of rm i under
market structure S by pSi .
6In fact, in our model, a merger of two rms is equivalent to perfect collusion between
them.
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As might be expected, when international market structure is asymmetric
(S = HM or FM), reaction functions of rms are also asymmetric. We
discuss only the market structure HM since reaction functions under FM
are completely analogous. If home rms are merged, they internalize price
competition between themselves and solve:
max
fp1;p2g
h(:) =
2X
i=1
1
4
(pi   ci   ti)(  pi   (pi   Pj)) (4)
whereas the problem facing a typical foreign rm is analogous to that under
oligopoly. The merged home rms (common) reaction function for both
products at the price competition stage is as follows:
pi =
4+ (2 + 4)(ci + ti) + P i
4(2 + )
(5)
whereas a typical foreign rms reaction function is:
pj =
4+ (3 + 4)(cj + tj) + 2pi + p~j
2(4 + 3)
(6)
where ~j denotes the other foreign rm. Note from the above reaction func-
tion that a unit increase in the price of the merged home rm induces a
greater price increase by a foreign rm than does a unit price increase by the
other foreign rm:
@pj
@pi
= 2 >  =
@pj
@p~j
In other words, the home merger not only internalizes price competition
between home rms, it also makes competing foreign rms more sensitive
to price increases by the merged home rm. The intuition is simple: an
increase in the price of the merged home rm applies to both goods exported
by the home country whereas that of a competing foreign rm applies only
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to one good. Similarly, a comparison of the reaction function of the merged
rm to that of a typical rm under oligopoly shows that the merged rm
is more responsive to price increases by rival rms (due to internalization
of competition). The equilibrium prices charged by the merged home rm
and competing foreign rms under market structure HM are reported in the
appendix (where we also prove the following lemma).
Lemma 1: Let h denote the merged home rm and f a competing foreign
rm. The following hold: ( i) @p
HM
h
@th
<
@pHMf
@tf
and ( ii) @p
HM
h
@tf
>
@pHMf
@th
.
In other words, the merged rms price increase in response to an increase
on own tari¤ is weaker than the corresponding response of a typical compet-
ing rm. On the other hand, the cross-tari¤ e¤ect is weaker for competing
rms relative to the merged rm. These results are useful for explaining
the e¤ects of MFN when international market structure is asymmetric (see
section 3.2).
Now consider market competition under international duopoly. The max-
imization problems and the reaction functions of home and foreign mergers
under international duopoly (D) are the same as in (4) and (5) respectively.
As expected, the equilibrium price under D is the highest among all possible
market structures (relevant expression is in the appendix).
Having solved for the market equilibrium under all possible market struc-
tures, we are now ready to consider the trade policy stage. In the next
section, we contrast two scenarios: one where the importing country is free
to discriminate among exporters and another where it must treat them sym-
metrically (MFN treatment).
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3 MFN versus tari¤ discrimination
At the trade policy stage, there are two main issues that deserve exami-
nation. First, the linkages between tari¤s, production costs, and market
concentration levels are of interest. Second, the e¤ects of MFN on equilib-
rium tari¤s and welfare deserve investigation. For this purpose, it is useful
to separately consider the two types of asymmetries (market structure and
production costs).
3.1 MFN under cost asymmetry
Let t = (th; tf ) denotes the importing countrys tari¤ vector under tari¤
discrimination. The basis for tari¤ discrimination is the asymmetry in pro-
duction costs of exporters (i.e. ch 6= cf). We assume that the importing
country chooses its tari¤ schedule to maximize its own welfare. Since no pro-
duction takes place in the importing country, local welfare is the sum of the
consumer surplus and tari¤ revenue. Given international market structure
S, the importing country solves:
max
t
W (t)  CS(t) + th
2X
i=1
qi(t) + tf
4X
i=3
qi(t): (7)
where consumer surplus equals
CS(t) 
P4
i=1(  pi(t))qi(t)
2
(8)
Let tSi denote the importing countrys optimal discriminatory tari¤ on rm
i under market structure S. The following result is easy to show:
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Proposition 1: Under symmetric market structures (S = O or D), the
importing countrys optimal discriminatory tari¤ schedule has the following
features: (i) The tari¤ imposed on the foreign country is higher than that
imposed on the home country if and only if the foreign countrys production
cost is lower than that of the home country: tSf  tSh i¤ cf  ch ; (ii) The
true e¢ ciency ranking of countries is preserved under tari¤ discrimination:
cf + t
S
f  ch + tSh i¤ cf  ch; and (iii) as international market structure
becomes more concentrated, tari¤s increase: tOi < t
D
i .
Under symmetric market structures, the importing country imposes a
higher tari¤ on low cost producers since they enjoy higher mark-ups and
the importing country can extract more rents from them. Furthermore, the
bigger the technology gap between the two exporting countries, the stronger
is the degree of tari¤ discrimination.7 Part (ii) of proposition 1 states that
the higher tari¤ on the low cost exporter does not reverse the true e¢ ciency
ranking of rms. It is clear that such a reversal can never be optimal from the
importing countrys perspective: if the tari¤ on relatively low cost exporters
was high enough to actually make them relatively high cost (i.e. their tari¤
included costs exceed those of trulyhigh cost producers), the volume of
their exports would be lower as would be the per unit revenue raised from
them relative to that raised from the trulyhigh cost rms. As a result,
the importing country could improve its welfare by lowering its tari¤s on the
low cost rms to levels where they would actually be exporting more (which
happens when the true cost ranking of exporters holds).
Now consider the importing countrys optimal MFN tari¤. Under MFN,
7This result also obtains under quantity competition (see, for example, Gatsios 1990).
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it solves the following problem:
max
t
W I(t)  CS(t) + t
4X
i=1
qi(t): (9)
The problem in (9) di¤ers from the problem in (7) in only one respect: now
the importing country imposes the same tari¤ on all exporters irrespective
of their costs. Dene the optimal MFN tari¤ under market structure S as:
tS = ArgmaxW I(t) (10)
The following result is shown in the appendix:
Proposition 2: Under symmetric market structures ( S = O or D), the
importing countrys optimal MFN tari¤ tS has the following features: (i) it
is lower (higher) than the optimal discriminatory tari¤ on low (high) cost
exporters: tSf  tS  tSh i¤ cf  ch; (ii) the importing countrys average
tari¤ is the same under MFN and tari¤ discrimination: tSh + t
S
f = 2t
S; and
(iii) as the market structure becomes more concentrated, the optimal MFN
tari¤ increases: tO < tD.
Part (i) of the above proposition informs us that MFN adoption by a
country has distributional implications for its trading partners: the low cost
exporters gain while high cost ones lose. Part (ii) of the proposition shows
that MFN is indeed distinct from trade liberalization MFN adoption by the
importing country does not alter its average tari¤.8 Finally, part (iii) shows
that an increase in the degree of market concentration leads the importing
country to raise its MFN tari¤.
8Interestingly, this result also holds true in linear models of quantity competition. See
Saggi (2004), Choi (1995), Hwang and Mai (1991), and Gatsios (1990).
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As might be expected, the importing country has no unilateral incentive
to adopt MFN. But is MFN adoption socially desirable? Since MFN does not
result in trade liberalization, the answer to this question is not immediately
obvious.9 In order to understand the implications of MFN adoption from the
viewpoint of world welfare, dene world welfare as the sum of welfare in each
country. Given the importing countrys tari¤ vector t, world welfare equals:
WW (t) =WH(t) +W F (t) +W I(t) (11)
Substituting t = (tSh ; t
S
f ) yields world welfare under tari¤discrimination while
setting t = (tS; tS) yields world welfare under MFN.
Due to the market segmentation, it is su¢ cient to consider the sum of
the welfare of the importing country and the prot of home and foreign
exporters in the importing country. As a result, under market structure S,
MFN adoption by the importing country improves world welfare if and only
if:
W I(tS) +
4X
i=1
i(t
S)  W I(tSh ; tSf ) +
4X
i=1
i(t
S
h ; t
S
f ) (12)
The following is shown in the appendix:
Proposition 3: Under symmetric market structures ( S = O or D)
world welfare under MFN is higher than that under tari¤ discrimination:
WW (tS)  WW (tSh ; tSf ).
The above result shows that MFN adoption contributes to world welfare
even though it is not accompanied by any trade liberalization. The reason
is that tari¤ discrimination is biased against low cost exporters. As a result,
9One thing is clear from part (i) of the above proposition: MFN is not Pareto-improving
over tari¤ discrimination.
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under MFN, world output is produced at lower total cost relative to tari¤
discrimination. Alternatively, tari¤ discrimination diverts trade away from
low cost exporters to high cost ones and MFN eliminates this ine¢ ciency.
Next, we consider the impact of MFN when international market struc-
ture is asymmetric.
3.2 MFN under market structure asymmetry
To isolate the e¤ect of market structure asymmetry on the tari¤ response
of the importing country and world welfare, assume that cost structure is
symmetric across countries (ch = cf = c). As before, we discuss only the
market structure HM wherein home rms are merged into a single unit
whereas foreign rms compete (the results under market structure FM are
completely analogous). Let tHMh and t
HM
f denote the optimal discriminatory
tari¤s on home and foreign rms under the market structure HM . Similarly,
let tHM denote the MFN tari¤ under market structure HM . The following
result is shown in the appendix:
Proposition 4: Suppose costs are symmetric across exporting countries
(ch = cf = c). Then the following hold: (i) Under tari¤ discrimination,
the importing country imposes a higher tari¤ on merging rms relative to
independent rms: tHMh > tHMf ; (ii) the MFN tari¤ is bound by these two
discriminatory tari¤s: tHMh > tHM > tHMf ; (iii) the average tari¤ level is
higher under discrimination relative to MFN: tHMh + t
HM
f > 2tHM ; and (iv)
world welfare is higher under MFN than under tari¤ discrimination.
Part (i) of the above result can be explained as follows. First, note that
when free to discriminate, the importing country has incentive to impose a
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higher rent extracting tari¤ on the merged rms since its mark-up is higher
than that of competing rms. Second, Lemma 1 states that the harmful
e¤ect of a unit tari¤ increase on local consumer surplus is lower when the
increase applies to the merged unit relative to when it applies to a competing
rm. The weaker price response of the merged rm to a tari¤ increase gives
the importing country an additional incentive (besides the higher mark-up
charged by the merged rm) to impose a higher tari¤ on the merged unit
under tari¤ discrimination.
One implication of part (ii) is that the incentives of rms to merge un-
der MFN are higher relative to tari¤ discrimination since the merged rm
faces a lower tari¤ under MFN. Part (iii) of the above proposition shows
that when international market structure is asymmetric, MFN adoption by
the importing country results in some trade liberalization since the average
tari¤ level is lower under MFN relative to discrimination. This result can
be understood as follows. By denition, under MFN, the importing country
cannot treat the merged rm any worse than a typical competing rm. As
a result, relative to tari¤ discrimination, the tari¤ imposed on the merged
unit is lower under MFN while that on a typical competing rm is higher.
To compensate consumers for the relatively higher tari¤ on competing rms,
the home country lowers its average tari¤ under MFN relative to discrimina-
tion (i.e. unilateral MFN adoption is accompanied by some degree of trade
liberalization). Were the average level of tari¤ protection to remain the same
under MFN and tari¤discrimination, local consumers would be strictly worse
o¤ under MFN due to the relatively stronger price response of a competing
rm to a tari¤ increase (Lemma 1).
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Thus far, we have analyzed the two types of asymmetries (cost and mar-
ket structure) in isolation and found that MFN adoption is world welfare
improving under both cases. But what if both asymmetries co-exist? This
question is examined next.
3.3 MFN under both asymmetries
Let c  ch   cf be the technology gap between rms. When both types
of asymmetries are present, there are two distinct scenarios to examine: (i)
merging rms are low cost relative to competing rms (i.e. c < 0) and (ii)
merging rms are high cost relative to competing rms (i.e. c > 0).
Following the results obtained from Proposition 1 and Proposition 4, it is
easy to see that under scenario (i), the importing countrys optimal discrim-
inatory tari¤ on the (low cost) merging rms is higher than that on high cost
(competing) ones and that the MFN tari¤ is bound by the two discriminatory
tari¤s. Furthermore, combining the world welfare ranking in Proposition 3
and Proposition 4, it is straightforward to argue that MFN adoption by the
importing country necessarily improves world welfare under scenario (i).
But what if merging rms are high cost? Under this scenario, there are
two contradictory e¤ects that determine the comparison of MFN and tari¤
discrimination. On the one hand, the fact that the high cost rms have
more market power calls for a higher discriminatory tari¤ on them. On the
other hand, precisely because they are high cost the importing country has
an incentive to impose higher tari¤s on competing rms. These two e¤ects
cancel out at some critical technology gap between merging and independent
rms:
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Proposition 5: Suppose merging rms are high cost (i.e. c > 0).
Then, under tari¤ discrimination, the merged unit faces a higher tari¤ rel-
ative to that under MFN i¤ the technology gap between rms falls below a
critical threshold (i.e. c  c). Furthermore, tari¤ discrimination yields
higher global welfare than MFN.
Let WWHM  WW (tHM) WW (tHMh ; tHMf ) denote the di¤erence be-
tween world welfare under MFN and discrimination under market structure
HM . We show in the appendix that WWHM > 0 i¤c > c. When the
cost di¤erence between rms is higher than the critical level c, discrimina-
tion is biased against low cost rms and MFN adoption is welfare improving
since it removes this bias. On the other hand, when the cost di¤erence is
lower than the critical levelc, discrimination can be socially desirable since
it is biased against the high cost rm. Under such a situation, MFN adoption
actually lowers aggregate world welfare.
Furthermore, either when the products become independent ( ! 0)
or when they become perfect substitutes ( ! 1), the critical threshold
c approaches zero. Intuitively, at these extreme substitutability levels, a
merger has no a¤ect on world welfare since market structure is either perfectly
competitive (for  ! 1) or perfectly monopolistic (for  ! 0) to begin
with. Under either of these scenarios, only the technological gap between
rms (i.e. c) matters and we know from Proposition 3 that MFN improves
world welfare when countries are asymmetric only with respect to production
costs.
The following insight emerges from the above analysis: from a welfare
viewpoint, world interest regarding unilateral MFN adoption may actually
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coincide with that of the importing country when production costs and
market structure are asymmetric across countries, MFN adoption reduces
not only the importing countrys welfare but may also adversely a¤ect world
welfare.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple three-country oligopoly model of trade to shed
light on the economics of the MFN principle. We contrast two scenarios:
one where the importing country is free to discriminate among exporters
and another where it must treat them symmetrically (MFN treatment). The
focus has been on two underlying asymmetries (production cost and market
structure) that generate a rationale for tari¤ discrimination.
When market structure is symmetric across countries, it is found that
MFN adoption leads to an increase in the output of low cost producers rel-
ative to high cost ones. In other words, switching from a discriminatory
tari¤ schedule to MFN benets low cost exporters and hurts high cost ones.
This result conrms a key insight provided by several quantity competition
models: MFN improves world welfare by eliminating trade diversion that
results from tari¤ discrimination. This is reassuring since there are few, if
any, general policy conclusions that emerge from oligopolistic models.
When rms are symmetric with respect to costs, under tari¤ discrimina-
tion, the importing country levies a higher tari¤ on a merged rm relative
to competing ones. An implication of this result is that rms have stronger
incentives to merge under MFN relative to tari¤ discrimination. When both
types of asymmetries exist simultaneously, the welfare e¤ects of MFN are
18
ambiguous. In particular, if merging rms are high cost, MFN can deliver
lower world welfare than tari¤ discrimination. This result is important since
it points out that market structure asymmetries (that may result from inter-
national di¤erences in antitrust and/or merger policies) can be an important
determinant of the desirability of MFN.
5 Appendix
All supporting calculations not provided in the text are given below:
Equilibrium prices
Equilibrium price under international oligopoly equals:
pOi =
4a(7 + 8) + (3 + 4)((5 + 8)(ci + ti) + 2(c i + t i))
(3 + 8)(7 + 8)
(13)
When home rms are merged, their (common) price for the two home prod-
ucts equals:
pHMh =
2(7 + 8) + (32 + 4)(cf + tf ) + (5 + 8)( + 2)(ch + th)
4(22 + 9 + 8)
(14)
whereas the equilibrium price charged by competing foreign rms equals:
pHMf =
2(3 + 4) + (3 + 4)( + 2)(cf + tf ) + (
2 + 2)(ch + th)
2(22 + 9 + 8)
 pHMh
(15)
Under duopoly, we have:
pDi =
2(3 + 4) + (2 + 4)( + 2)(ci + ti) + (
2 + 2)(c i + t i)
( + 4)(3 + 4)
(16)
Lemma 1
Using the prices under HM reported above, the following is immediate:
@pHMh
@th
  @p
HM
f
@tf
=   ( + 2)
4(22 + 9 + 8)
 0
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and
@pHMf
@th
  @p
HM
h
@tf
=   
2
4(22 + 9 + 8)
 0
Proposition 1
Under tari¤ discrimination, we have:
max
th;tf
W I(t) 
P4
i=1(  pi(t))qi(t)
2
+ th
2X
i=1
qi(t) + tf
4X
j=3
qj(t):
where t =(th; tf ) is importing countrys tari¤ vector. Solving this problem
under symmetric market structures with cost asymmetry yields the following
optimal discriminatory tari¤s:
tOh =
2(32(cf   ch) + 24(  ch) + (22  26ch + 4cf ))
3(112 + 56 + 48)
and
tDh =
2(cf   ch) + 12(  ch) + (10  12ch + 2cf )
52 + 36 + 36
Switching ch and cf yields the tari¤s on the foreign rms. To prove part (i)
note that
tOh   tOf =
4(cf   ch)( + 1)
(11 + 12)
 0 i¤ ch  cf
and
tDh   tDf =
2(cf   ch)( + 1)
(5 + 6)
 0 i¤ ch  cf
Now consider part (ii). We have:
(ch + t
O
h )  (cf + tOf ) =
(ch   cf )(7 + 8)
(11 + 12)
 0 i¤ ch  cf
and
(ch + t
D
h )  (cf + tDf ) =
(ch   cf )(3 + 4)
(5 + 6)
 0 i¤ ch  cf
20
Finally, part (iii) follows immediately from the optimal tari¤ formulae re-
ported above.
Proposition 2
Under MFN the importing country solves:
max
t
W I(t) 
P4
i=1(  pi(t))qi(t)
2
+ t
4X
i=1
qi(t):
Solving this problem yields the optimal MFN tari¤s:
tO =
2(2  ch   cf )
3( + 4)
and tD =
2  ch   cf
( + 6)
:
To prove parts (i) and (ii) note that
tOh   tO = tO   tOf =
2(cf   ch)( + 1)
(11 + 12)
 0
tDh   tD = tD   tDf =
(cf   ch)( + 1)
(5 + 6)
 0
For part (iii), we have:
tD   tO = (2  ch   cf )
3( + 6)( + 4)
 0
Proposition 3
Under oligopoly, we have:
WW (tO) WW (tOh ; tOf ) =
2(ch   cf )2( + 1)3(25 + 28)(3 + 4)
(7 + 8)2(11 + 12)2
> 0
Similarly, under duopoly we have:
WW (tD) WW (tDh ; tDf ) =
(ch   cf )2( + 1)3(11 + 14)(2 + )
2(5 + 6)2(3 + 4)2
> 0
Proposition 4
We report only tari¤s under HM (those under FM are analogous):
21
tHMh =
2(11 + 12)(  c)
132 + 78 + 72
and tHMf =
4(5 + 6)(  c)
132 + 78 + 72
and
tHMh   tHMf =
2(  c)
132 + 78 + 72
 0
Under MFN we have:
tHM = tFM =
(  c)(1033 + 4262 + 576 + 256)
644 + 5753 + 16382 + 1888 + 768
Note that the optimal MFN tari¤s under HM and the FM are the same.
Now consider part (ii). We have:
h  tHMh   tHM =
(  c)(3 + 4)(233 + 1742 + 336 + 192)
F ()
 0
and
f  tHM   tHMf =
(  c)( + 2)(593 + 4182 + 736 + 384)
F ()
 0
where
F ()  (132 + 78 + 72)(644 + 5753 + 16382 + 1888 + 768)
To prove part (iii), note that:
h  f = (  c)2
2( + 1)(52 + 34 + 32)
F ()
 0
Finally consider part (iv). We have:
WWHM =
2( + 1)( + 2)2(3 + 4)G()(  c)
2(132 + 78 + 72)
 0
where
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G()  (1856
5 + 188614 + 673663 + 1122482 + 89472 + 27648)
(644 + 5753 + 16382 + 1888 + 768)
Proposition 5
Expressions for equilibrium tari¤s under MFN and discrimination are
contained in proof of proposition 4. From there, we have:
tHMh = t
HM = tHMf i¤c = c
 =
2(  ch)
52 + 28 + 24
Since tari¤s under MFN and tari¤ discrimination are equal when c =
c, it must be that WWHM = 0 i¤c = c:
References
[1] Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, 1999. An Economic Theory of
GATT.American Economic Review 89(1), 215-248.
[2] Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, 2003. Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations, Bilateral Opportunism and The Rules of GATT/WTO." Journal
of International Economics, forthcoming.
[3] Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer, 1985. Export Subsidies
and International Market Share Rivalry.Journal of International Eco-
nomics 18, 83-100.
[4] Caplin, Andrew and Kala Krishna, 1988. Tari¤s and the Most Favored
Nation Clause: a Game Theoretic Approach. Seoul Journal of Eco-
nomics 1, 267-289.
[5] Choi, Jay Pil, 1995. Optimal Tari¤s and the Choice of Technology:
Discriminatory Tari¤s vs. the Most Favored Nation Clause.Journal of
International Economics 38(1), 143-160.
[6] Davidson, Carl and Raymond Deneckere, 1985. Incentives to Form
Coalitions with Bertrand Competition.Rand Journal of Economics
16, 473-486.
23
[7] Ederington, Josh and Phillip McCalman, 2003. Discriminatory Tari¤s
and International Negotiations.Journal of International Economics 61,
397-424.
[8] Ethier, Wilfred J., 2002. Unilateralism in a Multilateral World.Eco-
nomic Journal 112, 266-292.
[9] Ethier, Wilfred, J., 1999.  Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination In a Mul-
tilateral World.University of Pennsylvania PIER Working Paper No.
99-001.
[10] Gatsios, Konstantine, 1990. Preferential Tari¤s and the Most Favoured
NationPrinciple: A Note.Journal of International Economics 28, 365-
373.
[11] Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michael M. Kostecki, 2001. The Political
Economy of the World Trading System. Oxford University Press, New
York, NY.
[12] Horn, Henrik and Petros C. Mavroidis, 2001. Economic and Legal As-
pects of the Most-Favored Nation Clause.European Journal of Political
Economy 17, 233-279.
[13] Hwang H., and C.-C Mai, 1991. Optimum Discriminatory Tari¤s Un-
der Oligopolistic Competition.Canadian Journal of Economics XXIV,
693-702.
[14] Ludema, Rodney, 1991. International Trade Bargaining and the Most
Favored Nation Clause.Economics and Politics 3, 1-20.
[15] McCalman, Phillip, 2002. Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations and the
Most Favored Nation Clause.Journal of International Economics 27,
151-176.
[16] Saggi, Kamal, 2004. Tari¤s and the Most Favored Nation Clause.
Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.
24
[17] Saggi, Kamal, 2003. Implications of the Most Favored Nation Clause
for Welfare and Multilateral Tari¤ Cooperation. Mimeo, Southern
Methodist University.
[18] Salant, Stephen W., Sheldon Switzer and Robert J. Reynolds, 1983.
Losses from Horizontal Merger: the E¤ects of an Exogenous Change in
Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium.Quarterly Journal
of Economics 48, 185-199.
[19] Shubik, Martin, 1980.Market Structure and Behavior. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press.
[20] Staiger, Robert W., 1995. International Rules and Institutions for
Trade Policy.In G.M. Grossman and K. Rogo¤, eds., The Handbook of
International Economics vol. 3, North Holland, 1495-1551.
25
